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1. INTRODUCTION
On 19 October 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada
released the first decisions in which it considered the
general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in Sec. 245 of the
federal Income Tax Act (ITA).1 Effective for transac-
tions entered into on or after 13 September 1988, this
rule was enacted as a deliberate response to the
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Stubart Invest-
ments Ltd. v. The Queen2 and was intended to reduce
what the Court had described as “the action and reac-
tion endlessly produced by complex, specific tax
measures aimed at sophisticated business practices,
and the inevitable, professionally guided and equally
specialized taxpayer reaction”.3 Designed “to distin-
guish between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax
avoidance”,4 the GAAR operates to deny a “tax bene-
fit” that would otherwise result from an “avoidance
transaction” or “series of transactions” of which the
avoidance transaction is a part5 if the transaction
results in a misuse of the provisions of the ITA, the
Income Tax Regulations, the Income Tax Application
Rules, a tax treaty, or any other relevant enactment, or
an abuse having regard to those provisions read as a
whole.6
Although the ITA defines the terms “tax benefit”,7
“avoidance transaction”,8 and “series of transactions”,9
it is up to the courts to decide if these requirements are
satisfied in the context of specific transactions and
whether an avoidance transaction results in a misuse or
abuse within the meaning of the statutory rule. In its
unanimous decisions in Canada Trustco Mortgage
Company v. Canada10 and Mathew v. Canada,11 the
Supreme Court of Canada considered each of these
issues and provided important guidance on the inter-
pretation and application of the GAAR.
This article reviews the decisions in Canada Trustco
and Mathew in light of the previous tax jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court of Canada and the lower court
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1. R.S.C. 1985, Chap. 1 (5th Supp.) (as amended).
2. [1984] CTC 294, 84 DTC 6305 (SCC) (hereafter “Stubart Invest-
ments”). Although rejecting the traditional “strict construction” approach to
the interpretation of tax statutes, the Stubart Investments decision reaf-
firmed the traditional approach adopted in C.I.R. v. Duke of Westminster,
[1936] AC 1 (HL), that tax consequences should be based on the legal char-
acter of transactions and relationships regardless of their economic or com-
mercial substance and the absence of any non-tax purpose for their exist-
ence.
3. Stubart Investments, supra note 2, Para. 66, cited in Canada, Depart-
ment of Finance, Tax Reform 1987: Economic and Fiscal Outlook (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 18 June 1987), reproduced in White Paper on Tax
Reform (Don Mills, Ontario: CCH, 1987), at 211.
4. Hon Michael H. Wilson, Minister of Finance, Explanatory Notes to
Legislation Relating to Income Tax (June 1988), at 461 (hereafter
“Explanatory Notes”).
5. ITA, Sec. 245(2) provides: “Where a transaction is an avoidance
transaction, the tax consequences to the person shall be determined as is
reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a tax benefit that, but for
this section, would result, directly or indirectly, from that transaction or
from a series of transactions that includes that transaction.” See also ITA,
Sec. 245(5), which sets out various ways in which the tax consequences to
a person may be determined in order to deny a tax benefit that would other-
wise result from an avoidance transaction.
6. ITA, Sec. 245(4). As originally enacted, this provision stipulated that
the GAAR would not apply to a transaction “where it may reasonably be
considered that the transaction would not result directly or indirectly in a
misuse of the provisions of this Act or an abuse having regard to the provi-
sions of this Act, other than this section, read as a whole”. Sec. 245(4) was
amended in 2005, with retroactive application to the GAAR’s effective
date, by specifying that the GAAR would apply to a misuse or abuse of the
Income Tax Regulations, the Income Tax Application Rules, a tax treaty, or
any other relevant enactment, as well as the ITA, and by converting the
double negative language of the initial provision to a positive test stipulat-
ing that the GAAR “applies to a transaction only if it may reasonably be
considered that the transaction ... would ... result ... in a misuse ... or ...
abuse ...”. The implications of this amendment are considered later in this
article.
7. ITA, Sec. 245(1) defines “tax benefit” as “a reduction, avoidance, or
deferral of tax or other amount payable under this Act or an increase in a
refund of tax or other amount under this Act”, including “a reduction,
avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount that would be payable under
this Act but for a tax treaty or an increase in a refund of tax or other amount
under this Act as a result of a tax treaty”.
8. ITA, Sec. 245(3) defines “avoidance transaction” as “any transaction
(a) that, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax ben-
efit, unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to have been
undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to
obtain the tax benefit; or (b) that is part of a series of transactions, which
series, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax ben-
efit, unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to have been
undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to
obtain the tax benefit”. See ITA, Sec. 245(1), which defines “transaction”
to include “an arrangement or event”.
9. ITA, Sec. 248(10) stipulates that a series of transactions is “deemed to
include any related transaction or events completed in contemplation of the
series”.
10. 2005 SCC 54 (hereafter “Canada Trustco”).
11. 2005 SCC 55 (hereafter “Mathew”).
pronouncements on the operation of the GAAR. Part 2
outlines the facts of each case and the grounds on
which the Crown sought to apply the GAAR, and Part
3 summarizes the decisions reached in each case by the
Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal.
Part 4 examines the Supreme Court of Canada deci-
sions and considers the Court’s general approach to tax
law and the GAAR and its application of this approach
to the facts of each case. Part 5 summarizes the con-
clusions of this examination.
2. FACTS
Like many tax avoidance cases, the transactions at
issue in Canada Trustco and Mathew are numerous
and complex. Canada Trustco involved a leveraged
sale-leaseback of depreciable property, as a result of
which the taxpayer sought to defer tax on leasing
income by deducting the capital cost allowance (CCA)
in respect of property for which it assumed little or no
economic risk. Mathew involved several transactions
through which an insolvent trust company sought to
transfer accrued losses on various mortgages to arm’s
length purchasers through the use of a partnership.
2.1. Canada Trustco
In Canada Trustco, the taxpayer was a large diversified
financial institution holding a portfolio of loans and
leases to government agencies and large companies.12
In order to obtain additional CCA deductions to shelter
leasing income that it anticipated, it entered into sev-
eral transactions with other parties, which were pre-
arranged and completed on 17 December 1996.13 The
transactions are shown in Diagram 1.
First, the taxpayer borrowed CAD 97.35 million from
the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). Second, the tax-
payer used these borrowed funds and CAD 22.65 mil-
lion of its own money to purchase a number of trailers
from a US company called Transamerica Leasing Inc.
(TLI) at a fair market value of CAD 120 million. Third,
the taxpayer leased these trailers to a Jersey company
called Maple Assets Investments Limited (MAIL)
under an agreement whereby MAIL could purchase the
trailers on 1 December 2005. Fourth, MAIL subleased
the trailers back to TLI on terms that were essentially
identical to those in the head lease. Fifth, TLI trans-
ferred CAD 116.4 million to MAIL in prepayment of
its obligations under the sublease. Sixth, MAIL
deposited CAD 97.35 million of these prepaid funds
with RBC for the purpose of making lease payments to
the taxpayer and used the remainder to purchase a
Government of Ontario bond maturing on 1 December
2005 at CAD 33.5 million, which it pledged to the tax-
payer as security for its purchase option under the
lease. Finally, the taxpayer assigned all the lease pay-
ments owing from MAIL to RBC, which agreed to
apply the assigned payments against the instalments of
interest and principal owing under its loan to the tax-
payer and to limit its recourse in respect of the loan to
these payments.
In computing its income for its 1997 taxation year, the
taxpayer included approximately CAD 6 million in
rental income from the trailers and deducted over CAD
31 million as the CCA on the trailers under ITA, Sec.
20(1)(a). The taxpayer used the excess deduction to
shelter other leasing income as allowed under the
“leasing property” rules in Secs. 1100(15) to (20) of
© 2006 IBFD
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12. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, [2003] 4 
CTC 2009, 2003 DTC 587 (TCC), Para. 4.
13. The transactions are explained in more detail in id., Paras. 4 to 14, and
in the Appendix to Canada Trustco, supra note 10. 
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Diagram 1: Canada Trustco transactions
8.
the Income Tax Regulations (Regulations)14 and relied
on the designation of trailers as “exempt property” in
Sec. 1100(1.3)(a)(v) of the Regulations to avoid the
application of the “specified leasing property” rules in
Secs. 1100(1.1) to (1.3) of the Regulations, which
would have limited the allowable CCA deductions if
they had applied.15 The Minister disallowed the CCA
deductions on the grounds that the taxpayer had either
failed to acquire title to the trailers or was subject to the
GAAR.16 The Crown abandoned the first of these argu-
ments before the hearing at trial and proceeded solely
on the basis that the GAAR applied to disallow the
CCA deductions,17 arguing that: (1) the taxpayer
obtained a “tax benefit” in the form of a tax deferral
resulting from the CCA deductions; (2) the transac-
tions constituted a “pre-ordained series” that was
“entered into primarily for the purpose of obtaining the
tax benefit and sheltering other income”; and (3) the
arrangement resulted in a misuse or abuse of the CCA
regime because the taxpayer did not incur any “true
cost” to acquire the trailers and a misuse or abuse of
the exempt property exception to the specified leasing
property rules because the sale-leaseback transactions
did not provide financing for the lessee “to acquire
assets for operational purposes”.18
2.2. Mathew
In Mathew, the taxpayers were individual and corpor-
ate investors who acquired interests in a partnership
called SRMP Realty and Mortgage Partnership
(SRMP), which had itself acquired a 99% interest in
another partnership called STIL II Partnership (STIL
II), to which Standard Trust Company (Standard) had
transferred various mortgages whose value was sub-
stantially less than their original cost. As Standard was
insolvent and had no income against which the accrued
losses could be deducted if realized, the company’s
liquidator devised a plan whereby: (1) Standard would
incorporate a wholly-owned subsidiary; (2) Standard
and the subsidiary would form a partnership; (3) Stan-
dard would transfer its mortgage portfolio to this non-
arm’s length partnership, relying on the stop-loss rule
in ITA, Sec. 18(13) as it read at the time to preserve the
accrued losses in the hands of the partnership;19 and (4)
Standard would sell its partnership interest to arm’s
length investors who could use the losses to shelter
other income when they were realized by the partner-
ship and flowed through to the partners.20 Pursuant to
this plan, Standard carried out the first three transac-
tions in October 1992 and the fourth in May 1993.
Standard incorporated a wholly-owned subsidiary on
21 October 1992, entered into a partnership agreement
with the subsidiary to create STIL II on 23 October
1992, transferred various mortgages to STIL II in
exchange for a 99% partnership interest on the same
day, and sold the 99% interest to an arm’s length com-
pany called OSFC Holdings Ltd. (OSFC) on 31 May
1993. In July 1993, OSFC sold its 99% partnership
interest to SRMP, whose units were acquired by the
taxpayers.
At the end of its fiscal year on 30 September 1993,
STIL II reported a net loss of CAD 52,674,376 result-
ing from the sale of some mortgages and a write-down
of its remaining inventory of mortgages. For its fiscal
year ending on 31 October 1993, SRMP reported a net
loss of CAD 52,384,474, most of which was attributa-
ble to its share of the STIL II losses. These losses were
allocated among the members of SRMP and deducted
in computing their incomes in 1993 and 1994. Dia-
gram 2 shows the transactions in Mathew.
The Minister disallowed these deductions on the basis
that the transactions were caught by the GAAR. At
trial, the Crown argued that the various transactions
comprised a series of transactions that resulted in a tax
benefit in the form of the deductions claimed by the
taxpayers,21 that the primary purpose of SRMP’s
acquisition of the 99% partnership interest in STIL II
and the taxpayers’ acquisition of the units of SRMP
was to obtain the tax benefit,22 and that the transactions
resulted in a misuse of ITA, Sec. 18(13) as it then
read23 and an abuse of the ITA scheme according to
© 2006 IBFD
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14. According to these rules, the aggregate of CCA deductions in respect
of depreciable property that is “leasing property” is generally limited to the
aggregate income from renting, leasing or earning royalties from leasing
properties, computed without regard to the CCA deductions.
15. According to these rules, the sale-leaseback of specified leasing prop-
erty is generally deemed to be a loan of the purchase price by the lessor to
the lessee, the rental payments under the lease are deemed to be blended
payments of interest and principal on the deemed loan, and the CCA deduc-
tions in respect of the leased property are limited to the notional principal
amount of the deemed loan that is deemed to be repaid each year. Sec.
1100(1.13)(a) of the Regulations exempts various kinds of property from
these rules, including in Sec. 1100(1.13)(v) “a trailer that is designed for
hauling freight and to be hauled under normal operating conditions by a
truck or tractor ...”.
16. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 12,
Para. 4. The first of these arguments turned on the fact that the sale-lease-
back was treated as a financing in the United States, such that TLI was held
not to have disposed of the trailers to Canada Trustco. As a result, TLI was
not subject to recapture on the transaction, and both TLI and Canada
Trustco were able to deduct the CCA, making the arrangement a classic
example of a double dip.
17. Id.
18. Id., Para. 31 (first argument), Para. 32 (second argument) and 
Paras. 43 and 45 (third argument).
19. According to this provision, where (a) a resident taxpayer engaged in
the business of lending money had incurred a loss on the disposition of
qualifying property (including mortgages) used or held in the business and
(b) the taxpayer or a person or partnership that did not deal at arm’s length
with the taxpayer had acquired or agreed to acquire the same or identical
property (“substituted property”) during the period commencing 30 days
before and ending 30 days after the disposition and owned or had a right to
acquire the substituted property at the end of this period, the loss was disal-
lowed and added in computing the cost to the taxpayer, person or partner-
ship of the substituted property. For dispositions after 26 April 1995, 
Sec. 18(13) no longer adds the disallowed loss in computing the cost of the
substituted property to a subsequent owner, but preserves the loss in the
hand of the original owner to be deducted when the subsequent owner dis-
poses of the substituted property. Although the explanatory information
accompanying the revised language states that the amendments “maintain
the provision’s original objective of denying the recognition of superficial
losses”, their effect is to ensure this result while simultaneously preventing
the transfer of accrued but unrealized losses to a subsequent owner, as Stan-
dard sought to do in Mathew.
20. Under ITA, Sec. 96(1), the income or loss of a partnership is com-
puted at the partnership level and allocated among the partners at the end of
the partnership’s fiscal period based on their respective shares in the part-
nership.
21. Mathew v. The Queen, [2003] 1 CTC 2045, 2002 DTC 1637 (TCC),
Paras. 140 and 154-155.
22. Id., Paras. 159-168.
23. Id., Para. 184. According to this argument: “[I]t is evident from sub-
section 18(13) that it was enacted as a ‘stop-loss provision’, the object of
which is to prevent taxpayers who are in the money-lending business from
artificially realizing losses on assets which have declined in market value
by transferring those assets to a person with whom they do not deal at arm’s
length, while maintaining control of the assets through the non-arm’s length
nature of their relationship. In [the Crown’s] opinion, subsection 18(13)’s 
which income is computed separately for each tax-
payer and the transfer of losses is generally prohib-
ited.24
3. TAX COURT AND FEDERAL COURT OF
APPEAL DECISIONS
The Tax Court of Canada allowed the taxpayer’s
appeal in Canada Trustco and dismissed the taxpayers’
appeals in Mathew.25 These decisions were upheld by
the Federal Court of Appeal,26 and again by the
Supreme Court of Canada. As a result, and also
because the Supreme Court strongly emphasized the
factual nature of most GAAR decisions and the corre-
spondingly limited role of appellate tribunals, it is par-
ticularly important to review the decisions at trial.
3.1. Canada Trustco
The trial judgement in Canada Trustco was delivered
by Miller TCJ. Adopting the “analytical path” recom-
mended by the Federal Court of Appeal in two earlier
cases,27 his analysis addressed three issues: (1) whether
the tax deferral resulting from the CCA deductions was
a tax benefit; (2) whether the arrangement that resulted
in the deferral could reasonably be considered to have
been entered into primarily for bona fide purposes
other than to obtain the tax benefit; and (3) whether
there was a misuse of the ITA provisions or an abuse of
the ITA read as a whole.28
Beginning with the issue of a “tax benefit”, the Tax
Court of Canada rejected the taxpayer’s argument that
the arrangement should be compared to a standard
sale-leaseback transaction, which would have yielded
identical CCA deductions that presumably would not
have been characterized as a tax benefit.29 Emphasiz-
ing that “[t]he definition of tax benefit should not be
determined in a vacuum, but should be determined in
the context of the question of whether there is an
avoidance transaction”,30 Miller TCJ concluded that
the inseparability of the tax and commercial aspects of
the transactions at issue made such a comparison inap-
propriate in this case.31 As a result, he held that the
characterization of a tax benefit should be assessed
“not in comparison to some hard-to-establish norma-
tive transaction, but in comparison to the taxpayer’s
position before the purported avoidance transaction”.32
© 2006 IBFD
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purpose is not to effect the transfer of unrealized losses from a taxpayer
who has no income against which to offset those losses to a taxpayer that
does not have such income. On the contrary, the transfer of superficial
losses to the transferee is merely a consequential rule allowing the superfi-
cial loss to be utilized by the transferee rather than being lost altogether.
Accordingly, it is counsel’s position that if one uses subsection 18(13) to
transfer losses to an arm’s length party, one is using it for a purpose for
which it is not intended and is therefore misusing it.”
24. Id., Paras. 201-205.
25. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 12;
Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21.
26. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, [2004] 2 
CTC 276, 2004 DTC 6119 (FCA); Mathew v. The Queen, [2004] 1 
CTC 115, 2003 DTC 5644 (FCA).
27. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 12,
Para. 48, citing OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen, [2001] 4 CTC 82, 2001
DTC 5471 (FCA) (hereafter “OSFC Holdings”); and Water’s Edge Village
Estates (Phase II) Ltd. v. The Queen, [2002] 4 CTC 1, 2002 DTC 7172
(FCA) (hereafter “Water’s Edge”). For a review of the Federal Court of
Appeal decision in OSFC Holdings, see Duff, David G., “Judicial Applica-
tion of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule in Canada: OSFC Holdings Ltd. v.
The Queen”, 57 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 7 (2003),
at 278.
28. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 12,
Paras. 49-52 (first issue), Paras. 53-57 (second issue), and Paras. 58-92
(third issue). At the time, Sec. 245(4) did not refer to the Income Tax Reg-
ulations, the Income Tax Application Rules, a tax treaty, or any other rele-
vant enactment. See note 6, supra.
29. Id., Para. 15.
30. Id., Para. 52.
31. Id., Para. 50, observing that “[t]his is not a case of a commercial ven-
ture whose very essence is readily separable from any tax implications,
which can be compared to a like venture with tax implications then over-
laid. The difficulty with this transaction is that the tax is integral to the very
commerciality of the deal – there is no simple tax-untainted transaction to
compare to”.
32. Id., Para. 52.
Standard Trust
Company
Diagram 2: Mathew transactions
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On this basis, the tax deferral resulting from the CCA
deductions constituted a tax benefit within the mean-
ing of ITA, Sec. 245(1).
Turning to the second issue regarding the taxpayer’s
purposes for entering into the transactions, the Court
rejected both the Crown’s argument that the sale-lease-
back arrangement was motivated solely by tax reasons
and the taxpayer’s argument that the tax purpose was
“incidental” to the commercial purposes of lease
financing and asset diversification.33 Although
acknowledging that the transactions resulted in “a
profitable investment in a commercial context”,34
Miller TCJ relied on the fact that the taxpayer specifi-
cally acquired property that was exempt from the spec-
ified leasing property rules35 and on planning docu-
ments highlighting the tax benefits resulting from the
tax shelter36 to conclude that “the tax benefit drove the
deal”.37 As a result, he held that the transactions could
not reasonably be considered to have been undertaken
or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than
to obtain the tax benefit.
Having thus concluded that the taxpayer had carried
out an avoidance transaction within the meaning of
ITA, Sec. 245(3),38 the Court proceeded to the last
issue concerning a misuse or abuse. Sidestepping the
taxpayer’s argument that the GAAR as it then read did
not apply to the Regulations that govern the deduction
of CCA,39 Miller TCJ employed the “two-stage analyt-
ical process” adopted by the majority of the Federal
Court of Appeal in OSFC Holdings,40 according to
which the court should first “identify ... the relevant
policy of the provisions or the Act as a whole” and sec-
ond “assess ... the facts to determine whether the
avoidance transaction constituted a misuse or abuse
having regard to the identified policy”.41 In the first
stage of this analysis, the decision stated that “[t]here is
no onus to be satisfied by either party”, but “from a
practical perspective, the Minister should ... set out the
policy with reference to the provisions of the Act or
extrinsic aids upon which he relies”.42 In the second
stage, on the other hand, the judgement stated that “the
onus remains on the taxpayer to prove the necessary
facts to refute the Minister’s assumptions of fact that
the avoidance transaction in question results in a mis-
use or abuse”.43 More generally, it emphasized that,
since the effect of the GAAR is to “invok[e] ... a policy
to override the words that Parliament has used” in spe-
cific provisions, “to deny a tax benefit where there has
been strict compliance with the Act, on the grounds
that the avoidance transaction constitutes a misuse or
abuse, requires that the relevant policy be clear and
unambiguous”.44
With respect to the relevant policy, whose framing
Miller TCJ described as “critical” but “tricky”,45 the
Court began by noting that the object and spirit of the
general CCA rules is “to provide for the recognition of
money spent to acquire qualifying assets to the extent
that they are consumed in the income earning process
under the Act”.46 To these basic provisions, however,
the leasing property rules were enacted in 1976 to pre-
vent the use of CCA deductions on leasing properties
to shelter non-leasing income, and the specified leas-
ing property rules were enacted in 1989 to further limit
the CCA deductions from leased property other than
“exempt property” which is “commonly leased for
operational purposes for which CCA reasonably
approximates actual depreciation”.47 Viewing these
rules as a whole, Miller TCJ concluded:
The object and spirit of the relevant provisions is to
limit the generous CCA treatment in lease financing
arrangements to a recognition of money invested to
acquire property leased for operational purposes, and
for which CCA reasonably approximates actual depreci-
ation, to the extent that such property is consumed in an
income-earning process, such consumption limited to
deductions against leasing income.48
Based on this interpretation of the relevant policy, the
Court concluded that the transactions at issue did not
result in a misuse or abuse within the meaning of ITA,
Sec. 245(4).49 Rejecting the Crown’s first argument
that the taxpayer had misused or abused the CCA rules
by claiming deductions on property in respect of which
it had incurred “no real economic cost”,50 Miller TCJ
stated that “[t]here is no specific legislative provision
requiring cost to be determined on any economic real-
ity test for purposes of the application of the Act’s
© 2006 IBFD
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33. Id., Para. 54.
34. Id., Para. 57.
35. Id., Para. 56, observing that “Canada Trust had approximately $100
million to be put out, and it sought exempt property investments. Why?
Because it had $51 million of leasing income that it needed to shelter and
only certain assets were still available to provide that CCA shelter.”
36. Id., noting that the taxpayer’s officer who recommended the transac-
tions to the Board reported that “[t]he transaction provided very attractive
returns, by generating CCA deductions which can be used to shelter other
taxable lease income generated by Canada Trust”.
37. Id.
38. Id., Para. 56. In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not specify
which of the many transactions in the pre-arranged series was the avoidance
transaction, apparently viewing the series itself as a composite avoidance
transaction. Whether this approach is consistent with the language of Sec.
245(3), which refers to an individual transaction that is part of a series of
transactions, is doubtful.
39. This argument was accepted by Archimbault TCJ in Rousseau-Houle
v. The Queen, 2001 CarswellNat 500, 2001 DTC 250 (Fr.) (TCC) (hereafter
“Rousseau-Houle”), and Fredette v. The Queen, [2001] 3 CTC 2468, 2001
DTC 621 (TCC) (hereafter “Fredette”). According to Miller TCJ: “If I
allow the appeal solely on the basis that GAAR is not applicable to Regula-
tions, I run the risk that the Federal Court of Appeal overturns Rousseau-
Houle and likewise effectively overrules my decision. I prefer proceeding
on the basis that any policies surrounding the availability of CCA stems
from the Act itself, as paragraph 20(1)(a) incorporates Regulations in the
legislation, and therefore the misuse/abuse analysis is warranted in this
case.” Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 12,
Para. 58. As explained in note 6, supra, Sec. 245(4) was amended in 2005,
with retroactive application to the GAAR’s effective date, to specify,
among other things, that the GAAR would apply to a misuse or abuse of the
Regulations as well as the ITA.
40. See note 27, supra.
41. Id., Para. 67.
42. Id., Para. 68, adding that “[o]therwise he places the taxpayer and the
Court in the difficult position of trying to guess the relevant policy at issue”.
43. Id.
44. Id., Para. 69.
45. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 12,
Para. 59.
46. Id., Para. 63, citing Water’s Edge, supra note 27, Para. 44.
47. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 12,
Para. 67.
48. Id., Para. 68.
49. Given his interpretation of the relevant policy, Miller TCJ considered
it unnecessary to distinguish between a misuse of specific provisions and an
abuse having regard to those provisions read as a whole. See id., Para. 90:
“As framed, the policy already incorporates the more general policy of the
scheme of CCA. In effect, the analysis of the misuse of the provisions and
the analysis of the abuse having regard to the provisions of the Act read as
a whole are inseparable. This arises due to the identification of the policy.”
50. Id., Para. 69.
CCA regime in the context of sale-leaseback-like
arrangements”,51 and held that the GAAR could not be
used to recharacterize the cost of the trailers in order to
determine whether there had been a misuse or abuse.52
Rejecting the Crown’s second argument that the sale-
leaseback arrangement misused or abused the exempt
property exception to the specified leasing property
rules by failing to provide financing for the lessee “to
acquire assets for operational purposes”, he observed
that the transactions converted the lessee’s assets into
cash and netted it CAD 3.6 million after prepaying the
lease,53 and determined that the arrangement was “not
so dissimilar from an ordinary sale-leaseback as to take
it outside the object and spirit of the relevant provi-
sions of the Act”.54 As a result, the Court concluded
that the transactions were not subject to the GAAR.55
In an extremely brief decision delivered orally, the
Federal Court of Appeal upheld the trial decision.
According to Evans JA (Rothstein and Pelletier JJA
concurring), the Court was “not persuaded that the Tax
Court Judge made a reviewable error when he con-
cluded that ... the transactions in question ... did not
constitute a misuse of a provision of the Act, or an
abuse of the capital cost allowance (‘CCA’) scheme as
a whole”.56 Rejecting the Crown’s argument that the
scheme of the CCA rules allowed deductions only in
respect of the “real” or “economic” cost incurred to
acquire an asset,57 the Court stated that “counsel was
unable to refer to any source that satisfied us that there
is a clear and unambiguous policy underlying para-
graph 20(1)(a), or the CCA scheme when read as a
whole, that renders it a misuse or an abuse of those pro-
visions for the taxpayer to claim CCA in this case”.58
3.2. Mathew
The trial judgement in Mathew was delivered by Dus-
sault TCJ, whose analysis, like that of Miller TCJ in
Canada Trustco, addressed the three basic elements for
the GAAR to apply: (1) a tax benefit; (2) an avoidance
transaction that could not reasonably be considered to
have been entered into primarily for bona fide pur-
poses other than to obtain the tax benefit; and (3) a
misuse of specific ITA provisions or an abuse of the
provisions of the ITA read as a whole. Unlike Miller
TCJ’s decision in Canada Trustco, however, Dussault
TCJ devoted considerable attention to the concept of
“series of transactions” which enters into the definition
of “avoidance transaction”.59
On the existence of a tax benefit, which Dussault TCJ
characterized as “a question of fact”,60 there was no
dispute. Nonetheless, although the taxpayers conceded
that the transactions resulted in a tax benefit, they also
argued that the benefit from deducting partnership
losses was mostly “a tax deferral” since any amount
deducted in excess of the adjusted cost base of their
partnership interests would ultimately be taxable as a
capital gain on the dissolution of the partnership or the
disposition of their partnership interests.61 Since the
GAAR provides that “the tax consequences to a person
shall be determined as is reasonable in the circum-
stances in order to deny a tax benefit” (ITA, Sec.
245(2)), the characterization of the benefit would thus
be relevant to the tax consequences if the GAAR were
held to apply. Despite the taxpayers’ argument, how-
ever, the Court relied on the fact that capital gains are
only partly taxable and on evidence that the taxpayers
planned to never wind up the partnership to conclude
that the tax benefit was more than a mere tax deferral.62
On the question of an avoidance transaction, Dussault
TCJ considered the concept of “series of transactions”
before addressing the primary purpose of specific
transactions comprising the series. Since the GAAR
applies to a series of transactions only if the series
results in a tax benefit and one or more of the transac-
tions comprising the series cannot reasonably be con-
sidered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily
for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax ben-
efit (ITA, Sec. 245(3)(b)), it is necessary to define the
series of transactions in order to determine whether the
statutory requirements for an avoidance transaction are
met.63 For this purpose, Dussault TCJ relied on the
Federal Court of Appeal decision in OSFC Holdings,64
whose facts were essentially the same as those in
Mathew.65
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51. Id., Para. 71.
52. Id., Para. 69: “To accept the Respondent’s position would be to
recharacterize the legal form and substance of the transaction, for the pur-
poses of then determining whether there has been a misuse or abuse. The
GAAR provisions cannot be applied in that way.” See also Para. 77:
“GAAR is not to be imposed lightly. It should not permit a recharacteriza-
tion of a transaction to find the transaction is abusive in its recharacterized
form. The transaction must be viewed in its legal context and if found abu-
sive, only then recharacterized to determine the reasonable tax conse-
quences.”
53. Id., Para. 87, concluding that the predetermined lease prepayment
“does not shift the nature of the cash it received away from a form of financ-
ing: a conversion of its assets into cash”.
54. Id., Para. 89: “The policy applies to a lease financing arrangement,
and that is what we have here. All elements of the policy have been met:
lease financing arrangement, money invested, acquisition of exempt prop-
erty, consumption of such property in an income earning process and limi-
tation of CCA to leasing income.”
55. Id., Para. 93.
56. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 26,
Para. 1.
57. Id., Para. 2.
58. Id., Para. 3.
59. ITA, Sec. 245(3)(b) includes in the definition of avoidance transaction
“any transaction ... that is part of a series of transactions, which series, but
for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless
the transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or
arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax bene-
fit”. As explained in note 38, supra, Miller TCJ appears to have regarded
the sale-leaseback arrangement in Canada Trustco as a single composite
transaction entered into primarily for tax reasons, rather than a series of
transactions at least one of which was entered into primarily to obtain a tax
benefit.
60. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Para. 235.
61. Id., Para. 236. See ITA, Sec. 53(2)(c)(i), which requires taxpayers to
deduct their share of the partnership losses in computing the adjusted cost
base of their interest in the partnership; ITA, Sec. 98(1)(c), which deems
any negative adjusted cost base to be a capital gain when a partnership
winds up; and ITA, Sec. 100(2), which deems any negative adjusted cost
base to be a capital gain when a taxpayer disposes of a partnership interest. 
62. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Paras. 237-242.
63. The characterization of a series of transactions may also affect the
application of ITA, Sec. 245(4) since it is an individual avoidance transac-
tion that must result in a misuse or abuse for the GAAR to apply. Where a
series of transactions results in a tax benefit, therefore, an avoidance trans-
action that is part of the series must also result in a misuse or abuse. 
64. See note 27, supra. 
65. OSFC was the company that first acquired Standard’s 99% partner-
ship interest in STIL II before selling the interest to SRMP. OSFC acquired
a 24% interest in SRMP as part of the consideration for the sale of the part-
nership interest and also deducted the partnership losses when they were
realized by SRMP.
In OSFC Holdings, a majority of the Federal Court of
Appeal determined that an ordinary series of transac-
tions must be “pre-ordained to produce a final result” –
meaning that “when the first transaction in the series is
implemented, all essential features of the subsequent
transaction or transactions are determined by persons
who have the firm intention and ability to implement
them”.66 ITA, Sec. 248(10), however, extends this
meaning to include “any related transactions or events
completed in contemplation of the series” – which the
majority in OSFC Holdings held to include any trans-
action having “some connection” with a preordained
series if the parties to this transaction “knew of” the
preordained series “such that it could be said that they
took it into account when deciding to complete the
transaction”.67 While the first three transactions in
OSFC Holdings were sufficiently preordained to com-
prise an ordinary series of transactions, the sale of
Standard’s 99% partnership interest in STIL II to
OSFC, the subsequent sale of the partnership interest
to SRMP, and the acquisition of partnership interests in
SRMP were not preordained since these were not
arranged at the time that Standard carried out the first
three transactions. Nonetheless, since OSFC knew
about these transactions and “took [them] into
account” when it purchased Standard’s partnership
interest,68 the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal
in OSFC Holdings held that this transaction was part of
series of transactions under the extended statutory
meaning in ITA, Sec. 248(10).69 It did not, however,
determine whether the subsequent sale of this partner-
ship interest to SRMP and the acquisition of units in
this partnership were also part of an extended series.
Notwithstanding the Court’s failure to specifically
address these last two transactions in OSFC Holdings,
Dussault TCJ concluded in Mathew that it could
“probably ... be inferred” that the majority in that case
considered that these transactions were arranged “with
full knowledge of the earlier transactions”.70 On this
basis, he concluded that all six transactions in Mathew
comprised a series of transactions for purposes of the
GAAR.71
Having characterized these transactions as a series,
Dussault TCJ found that each was an avoidance trans-
action under ITA, Sec. 245(3). Since the taxpayers
themselves acknowledged that the transactions
resulted in a tax benefit, the first part of the test in Sec.
245(3)(b) was easily met. In addition, Dussault TCJ
observed that the majority in OSFC Holdings specifi-
cally determined that the first four transactions were
avoidance transactions.72 Finally, he said that it was
reasonable to conclude that the final two transactions
were undertaken primarily to obtain the tax benefit.73
As a result, the only remaining question to determine
whether the GAAR applied was whether one or more
of these transactions resulted in a misuse of specific
ITA provisions or an abuse having regard to the provi-
sions of the ITA read as a whole.
Turning to the misuse or abuse analysis, Dussault TCJ
employed the “two-stage analytical process” set out in
OSFC Holdings, according to which the court should
identify the relevant policy of the provisions or the ITA
as a whole and then review the facts to determine
whether, having regard to the policy, the avoidance
transaction constitutes a misuse or abuse.74 With
respect to the stop-loss rule in ITA, Sec. 18(13), he
maintained that the policy is “to prevent taxpayers who
are in the money-lending business from artificially
realizing losses on assets which have declined in mar-
ket value by transferring them to a person with whom
they do not deal at arm’s length, while maintaining
control of the assets through the non-arm’s length rela-
tionship with the transferee”.75 More generally, he
declared that the scheme of the ITA suggests a “general
policy” according to which “losses cannot be trans-
ferred from one taxpayer to another”.76
Based on his interpretation of the policy of Sec.
18(13), Dussault TCJ explained that he would have
concluded that the use of this stop-loss rule to transfer
accrued losses to arm’s length persons was a misuse of
the provision.77 In OSFC Holdings, however, a major-
ity of the Federal Court of Appeal specifically held that
the transactions at issue did not result in a misuse of
Sec. 18(13).78 Regardless, he concluded that the trans-
actions resulted in an abuse of the ITA provisions read
as a whole by transferring “one corporation’s losses to
other corporations and individuals”.79 As a result, he
held that the transactions were subject to the GAAR.80
As in Canada Trustco, the Federal Court of Appeal
upheld the trial decision in Mathew in a very short
judgement. Noting that the facts at issue were essen-
tially the same as those in OSFC Holdings,81 the Court
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66. OSFC Holdings, supra note 27, Para. 24, adding that “there must be no
practical likelihood that the subsequent transaction or transactions will not
take place”. This approach is based on the “step-transactions doctrine”
developed by the House of Lords in several UK tax cases. See e.g. W.T.
Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1981] 1 All E.R. 865;
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. (1981), 54 
TC 200 (HL); Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] AC 474 (HL); and Craven v.
White, [1989] AC 398 (HL).
67. OSCF Holdings, supra note 27, Para. 36.
68. Id., Para. 38.
69. Id., Para. 44.
70. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Para. 254. While this is undoubt-
edly true of the sale of OSFC’s 99% partnership interest to SRMP and
OSFC’s acquisition of a 24% partnership interest in SRMP, it is less obvi-
ous that all of the other investors in SRMP had actual knowledge of the first
three transactions through which the mortgages were transferred to STIL II.
As this author argued elsewhere, however, it is not clear why courts should
insist on actual knowledge in order to apply the extended definition of
“series of transactions” in Sec. 248(10). See Duff, supra note 27, at 287.
71. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Para. 257.
72. Id., Para. 262.
73. Id., Paras. 275-296.
74. OSFC Holdings, supra note 27, Para. 67.
75. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Para. 302, citing OSFC Hold-
ings Ltd. v. The Queen, [1999] 3 CTC 2649, 99 DTC 1044 (TCC), Para. 54,
per Bowie TCJ. 
76. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Para. 317. In the Federal Court
of Appeal decision in OSFC Holdings, the majority discerned a general pol-
icy against loss trading for tax purposes, but concluded that this policy did
not extend to the transfer of losses between partners. See OSFC Holdings,
supra note 27, Paras. 92 and 101.
77. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Para. 304.
78. OSFC Holdings, supra note 27, Para. 81. For a critical evaluation of
this conclusion, suggesting that the majority’s misuse analysis should have
been informed by a broader view of the statutory scheme, see Duff, supra
note 27, at 287.
79. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Para. 316. Whether this state-
ment is consistent with the majority decision in OSFC Holdings is unclear
since this decision generally limited the policy against loss trading to trans-
fers between corporations. See OSFC Holdings, supra note 27, Para. 98,
stating that “the general policy of the Income Tax Act is against the trading
of non-capital losses by corporations, subject to specific limited circum-
stances” (emphasis added). 
80. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 21, Para. 504.
81. Mathew v. The Queen, supra note 26, Para. 2.
was content to rely on its prior decision in that case to
reject the taxpayers’ appeal. According to Rothstein
JA:
In OSFC, the Court determined that the general policy
of the Income Tax Act is against the transfer of non-cap-
ital losses between taxpayers. However, this general
policy was subject to some exceptions. For example, a
partner entering into the partnership may take advantage
of losses that were incurred by the partnership in that
year before he or she became a partner. On the change
of control of a corporation, losses of prior years are
deductible in limited circumstances. But the general
policy is that every person has independent status for
income tax purposes and that losses cannot be trans-
ferred between taxpayers dealing with each other at
arm’s length.82
Although the taxpayers argued that various stop-loss
provisions like ITA, Sec. 18(13) were further excep-
tions to this general policy,83 the Court concluded that
“[n]one of these provisions detract from the general
policy of the Income Tax Act against transferring losses
between taxpayers” and that they were “insufficient to
cause the Court to consider overruling its prior deci-
sion”.84
4. SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
DECISIONS
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals in
Canada Trustco and Mathew and upheld the trial
judgement in each case. The following sections exam-
ine both decisions, considering the Court’s general
approach to tax law and the GAAR and its application
of this approach to the facts of each case.
4.1. General approach to tax law and the GAAR
Of the two decisions, the Court’s general approach to
tax law and the GAAR appears mostly in Canada
Trustco. In fact, most of this judgement is devoted to
the general principles of statutory interpretation, the
role of the GAAR in Canadian tax law, and the various
requirements that must be satisfied for the GAAR to
apply.85 Before turning to the Court’s analysis of the
specific transactions in each case, it is useful to review
its more general approach to statutory interpretation,
tax avoidance and the GAAR, and the statutory
requirements for the GAAR to apply.
4.1.1. Principles of statutory interpretation
Like most Supreme Court of Canada tax cases since
Stubart Investments,86 the Court began its discussion of
statutory interpretation by citing E.A. Driedger’s
“modern rule” according to which “the words of an Act
are to be read in their entire context and in their gram-
matical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the
scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the inten-
tion of Parliament”.87 Although “Canadian tax legisla-
tion received a strict interpretation” under the influ-
ence of the UK decision in Commissioners of Inland
Revenue v. Duke of Westminster,88 the Court explained
that “[t]here is no doubt today that all statutes, includ-
ing the [Income Tax] Act, must be interpreted in a tex-
tual, contextual and purposive way”.89 Indeed,
although the Court did not make the point, it was its
own decision in Stubart Investments that signalled “the
demise of the strict interpretation rule for the construc-
tion of taxing statutes”.90
Notwithstanding its repeated references to “textual,
contextual and purposive” interpretation,91 however,
the Court also emphasized that the ITA “must be inter-
preted in order to achieve consistency, predictability
and fairness so that taxpayers may manage their affairs
intelligently”.92 Thus, “[w]hen the words of a provision
are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of
the words play [sic] a dominant role in the interpretive
process”.93 Likewise, it declared, repeating the follow-
ing much-quoted passage from Profs. Hogg’s and
Magee’s Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law:
It would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the
Income Tax Act if clear language in a detailed provision
of the Act were to be qualified by unexpressed excep-
tions derived from a court’s view of the object and pur-
pose of the provision.94
To the extent that the ITA is “dominated by explicit
provisions dictating specific consequences”, therefore,
the Court concluded that it necessarily “invit[es] a
largely textual interpretation”.95
One might conclude on this basis that the decision
reaffirms the “plain meaning” approach to statutory
interpretation that has dominated the tax decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada for the past decade.96 To
the extent that the text of a statutory provision cannot
be properly understood without some reference to its
context or purpose, however, this conclusion is proba-
bly mistaken. On the contrary, the Court emphasized:
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83. Id., Para. 15.
84. Id., Paras. 17 and 18.
85. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Paras. 10-13 (statutory interpretation),
Paras. 14-16 (role of the GAAR in Canadian tax law), and Paras. 17-66
(requirements of the GAAR).
86. See note 2, supra.
87. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 10, citing 65302 British Colum-
bia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 SCR 804, Para. 50. The original passage is
from Driedger, E.A., Construction of Statutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 2nd
ed., 1983), at 87, and was cited in Stubart Investments, supra note 2, 
Para. 61.
88. See note 2, supra (hereafter “Duke of Westminster”).
89. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 11.
90. Stubart Investments, supra note 2, Para. 60, referring to Willis, John,
“Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell”, 16 Canadian Bar Review 1 (1938).
91. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Paras. 10, 11, 40-44, 47, 59, 62, 64-66
and 73.
92. Id., Para. 12. References to “consistency, predictability and fairness”
also appear in Paras. 1, 31, 42, 50 and 61.
93. Id., Para. 10, adding that “where the words can support more than one
reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role”.
94. Hogg, Peter W. and Joanne E. Magee, Principles of Canadian Income
Tax Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 2nd ed., 1997), at 475-476.
95. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 13. See also Para. 11, noting that
“the particularity and detail of many tax provisions have often led to an
emphasis on textual interpretation”.
96. According to this interpretive approach: “When a provision is
couched in specific language that admits of no doubt or ambiguity in its
application to the facts, then the provision must be applied regardless of its
object and purpose. Only when the statutory language admits of some doubt
or ambiguity in its application to the facts is it useful to resort to the object
and purpose of the provision.” Hogg and Magee, supra note 94, at 454, cited
with approval in Friesen v. Canada, [1995] 2 CTC 369, 95 DTC 5551
(SCC), Para. 17. For a detailed explanation of this “plain meaning rule”, see
Duff, David G., “Interpreting the Income Tax Act – Part 1: Interpretive Doc-
trines”, 47 Canadian Tax Journal 464 (1999), at 504-517.
Even where the meaning of particular provisions may
not appear to be ambiguous at first glance, statutory
context and purpose may reveal or resolve latent ambi-
guities. “After all, language can never be interpreted
independently of its context, and legislative purpose is
part of the context. It would seem to follow that consid-
eration of legislative purpose may not only resolve
patent ambiguity, but may, on occasion, reveal ambigu-
ity in apparently plain language.”97
As a result, it seems that the Court abandoned the plain
meaning approach in favour of a more pragmatic
approach that combines textual, contextual and purpo-
sive considerations in order to “find a meaning that is
harmonious with the Act as a whole”.98 Given the defi-
ciencies of the plain meaning approach to statutory
interpretation,99 this is a welcome development.
4.1.2. Tax avoidance and the GAAR
The Court’s general approach to tax avoidance and the
GAAR also began, like many Supreme Court of
Canada tax decisions, by affirming the long-standing
principle from the Duke of Westminster case that tax-
payers may “manage their affairs” to minimize the tax
payable.100 Quoting its earlier decision in Shell Canada
Ltd. v. Canada,101 the Court declared:
[A]bsent a specific provision to the contrary, it is not the
courts’ role to prevent taxpayers from relying on the
sophisticated structure of their transactions, arranged in
such a way that the particular provisions of the Act are
met, on the basis that it would be inequitable to those
taxpayers who have not chosen to structure their trans-
actions that way.102
Indeed, it suggested that “[w]here Parliament has spec-
ified precisely what conditions must be satisfied to
achieve a particular result, it is reasonable to assume
that Parliament intended that taxpayers would rely on
such provisions to achieve the result they prescribe”.103
On the other hand, the Court observed that these estab-
lished principles of Canadian tax law were affected by
the enactment of the GAAR in 1988, which “superim-
posed” on the traditional approach “a prohibition on
abusive tax avoidance, with the effect that the literal
application of provisions of the Act may be seen as
abusive in light of their context and purpose”.104
According to the Court:
The GAAR was enacted in 1988, principally in response
to Stubart Investments ..., which rejected a literal
approach to interpreting the Act. At the same time, the
Court rejected the business purpose test, which would
have restricted tax reduction to transactions with a real
business purpose. Instead of the business purpose test,
the Court proposed guidelines to limit unacceptable tax
avoidance arrangements. Parliament deemed the deci-
sion in Stubart an inadequate response to the problem
and enacted the GAAR.105
To the extent that the GAAR constitutes a “provision
to the contrary” as contemplated in Shell Canada,
therefore, the Court concluded that “the Duke of West-
minster principle and the emphasis on textual interpre-
tation may be attenuated”.106
At the same time, the Court maintained that the GAAR
was not intended to repeal the Duke of Westminster
principle,107 but rather to “draw ... a line between legit-
imate tax minimization and abusive tax avoidance”.108
In this respect, it suggested that “[d]espite Parliament’s
intention to address abusive tax avoidance by enacting
the GAAR, Parliament nonetheless intended to pre-
serve predictability, certainty and fairness in Canadian
tax law”.109 For this reason, it declared that the task for
the Court is “to unite” the traditional approach with the
GAAR “in a framework that reflects the intention of
Parliament in enacting the GAAR and achieves consis-
tent, predictable and fair results”.110
This conclusion and the Court’s general approach to
tax avoidance and the GAAR seem entirely reasonable
and consistent with legislative intentions and the struc-
ture of the GAAR. As the Court itself observed, the
Explanatory Notes accompanying the draft GAAR leg-
islation affirmed that “tax planning – arranging one’s
affairs so as to attract the least amount of tax – is a
legitimate and accepted part of Canadian tax law”111
and that “the new rule seeks to distinguish between
legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance and
to establish a reasonable balance between protection of
the tax base and the need for certainty for taxpayers in
planning their affairs”.112 According to ITA, Sec.
245(4), moreover, a tax-motivated avoidance transac-
tion is subject to the GAAR only if it results in a mis-
use of specific ITA provisions or another relevant
enactment or an abuse having regard to these provi-
sions read as a whole. As a result, the Court’s general
approach to tax avoidance and the GAAR is as com-
mendable as its approach to statutory interpretation.
4.1.3. Application of the GAAR
Turning to the GAAR itself, the Court began like most
other GAAR cases by stating that the application of
this rule “involves three steps”:
The first step is to determine whether there is a “tax ben-
efit” arising from a “transaction” under s. 245(1) and
(2). The second step is to determine whether the trans-
action is an avoidance transaction under s. 245(3), in the
sense of not being “arranged primarily for bona fide
purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit”. The third
step is to determine whether the avoidance transaction is
abusive under s. 245(4).113
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97. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 47, citing Hogg, Peter W.,
Joanne E. Magee and Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law
(Scarborough: Carswell, 4th ed., 2002), at 563.
98. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 10.
99. For a critical review of this interpretive approach, see Duff, David G.,
“Interpreting the Income Tax Act – Part 2: Toward a Pragmatic 
Approach”, 47 Canadian Tax Journal 741 (1999), at 769-779.
100. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 12.
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102. Id., Para. 45.
103. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 11. See also Para. 31: “Parlia-
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104. Id., Para. 1. See also Para. 13, stating that the GAAR was “engrafted”
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105. Id., Para. 14.
106. Id., Para. 13.
107. Id., Para. 1, stating that the ITA “continues to permit legitimate tax
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108. Id., Para. 16, adding that “[t]his line is far from bright”.
109. Id., Para. 31.
110. Id., Para. 1.
111. Explanatory Notes, supra note 4, at 464, cited in Canada Trustco,
supra note 10, Para. 31.
112. Explanatory Notes, supra note 4, at 461, cited in Canada Trustco,
supra note 10, Para. 15.
113. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 17.
Observing that “[a]ll three requirements must be ful-
filled before the GAAR can be applied to deny a tax
benefit”,114 the Court examined each in turn.
4.1.3.1. Tax benefit
The Court’s analysis of the concept of “tax benefit” is
extremely brief, comprising only five paragraphs.115 In
some situations, the Court stated, “it may be that the
existence of a tax benefit can only be established by
comparison with an alternative arrangement”.116
Where a taxpayer claims a deduction, however, “the
existence of a tax benefit is clear, since a deduction
results in a reduction of tax”.117 More generally,
“[w]hether a tax benefit exists is a factual determina-
tion, initially by the Minister and on review by the
courts, usually the Tax Court”.118 As such, the Court
explained:
... the burden of proof is the same as in any tax proceed-
ing where the taxpayer disputes the Minister’s assess-
ment and its underlying assumptions of facts. The initial
obligation is on the taxpayer to “refute” or challenge the
Minister’s factual assumptions by contesting the exist-
ence of a tax benefit ....119
In addition, the Court concluded that where the Tax
Court determines that there is a tax benefit based on a
proper construction of the ITA and findings supported
by the evidence, “appellate tribunals should not inter-
fere, absent a palpable and overriding error”.120
Although the Court was undoubtedly right to conclude
that the characterization of a tax benefit is ultimately a
factual determination, it is also true that this factual
inquiry must be governed by a proper understanding of
the applicable law. In this respect, the Court’s brief dis-
cussion of this concept is unfortunate. In particular, its
statement that a deduction is necessarily a tax benefit
because it “results in a reduction of tax” seems incom-
patible with the structure of the GAAR and its purpose
to prevent abusive tax avoidance. As the concept of
“tax benefit” is central to the definition of “avoidance
transaction” in ITA, Sec. 245(3), it seems reasonable,
as Miller TCJ suggested in Canada Trustco, to deter-
mine the meaning of a tax benefit “in the context of the
question of whether there is an avoidance transac-
tion”.121 In this respect, as this author has argued else-
where, “one must imagine a notional amount of tax or
other amount payable or refundable” that would have
existed but for the avoidance transaction or series of
transactions of which the avoidance transaction is a
part.122 In some cases, as the Supreme Court of Canada
rightly recognized in Canada Trustco, this notional
amount may only be determined by comparing the
transaction or series of transactions entered into by the
taxpayer with an “alternative arrangement” that might
reasonably have been carried out but for the existence
of the tax benefit.123 In cases where the taxpayer would
not have carried out any transaction but for the tax ben-
efit, on the other hand, this notional amount might rea-
sonably be based on the tax consequences that would
have resulted if the transaction or series of transactions
had not been carried out.124 In neither case, however,
should a deduction invariably be regarded as a tax ben-
efit.125
4.1.3.2. Avoidance transaction
The Court’s discussion of the concept of “avoidance
transaction” was also relatively brief. Noting that
“[t]he function of this requirement is to remove from
the ambit of the GAAR transactions or series of trans-
actions that may reasonably be considered to have
been undertaken or arranged primarily for a non-tax
purpose”,126 the Court’s analysis addressed the concept
of “series of transactions” and the non-tax purpose test.
(a) Series of transactions. With respect to the concept
of “series of transactions”, the Court first endorsed the
conclusion reached by a majority of the Federal Court
of Appeal in OSFC Holdings that the ordinary meaning
of these words contemplates transactions that are “pre-
ordained in order to produce a given result” with “no
practical likelihood that the pre-planned events would
not take place in the order ordained”.127 Turning to the
extended meaning of “series of transactions” in ITA,
Sec. 248(10), however, the Court questioned the
majority’s interpretation in OSFC Holdings, which
included only related transactions carried out by par-
ties who “knew of” the preordained series “such that it
could be said that they took it into account when decid-
ing to complete the transaction[s]”.128 On the contrary,
the Court declared that the words “in contemplation
of” in Sec. 248(10) should be read “not in the sense of
actual knowledge but in the broader sense of ‘because
of’ or ‘in relation to’ the series”.129 In addition, the
extended meaning “can be applied to events either
before or after the basic avoidance transaction found
under s. 245(3)”.130
The Court’s conclusion regarding the ordinary mean-
ing of “series of transactions” is welcome and consis-
tent with legislative intent and the language and pur-
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117. Id.
118. Id., Para. 19.
119. Id., Para. 63, citing Hickman Motors Ltd. v. Canada, [1997] 2 
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120. Id., Para. 66(7).
121. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, supra note 12,
Para. 52. See text accompanying note 29, supra. 
122. Duff, David G., Canadian Income Tax Law (Toronto: Emond-Mont-
gomery, 2003), at 172.
123. See id., suggesting that “the finding of a tax benefit may itself depend
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reasonably have carried out, but for the existence of the tax benefit”.
124. See e.g. Arnold, Brian J. and James R. Wilson, “The General 
Anti-Avoidance Rule – Part 2”, 36 Canadian Tax Journal 1123 (1988), 
at 1154-1155.
125. For a similar conclusion, see Sandler, Daniel, “The Minister’s Burden
Under GAAR”, paper presented at the University of Toronto Faculty of
Law Symposium on the Supreme Court of Canada and the General Anti-
Avoidance Rule: Tax Avoidance after Canada Trustco and Mathew (18
November 2005) (hereafter “GAAR Symposium”), available at
www.law.utoronto.ca/conferences/taxavoidance.html.
126. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 21.
127. Id., Para. 25, citing Craven v. White, supra note 66, at 514, per Lord
Oliver. For the holding in OSFC Holdings, see note 66, supra, and accom-
panying text.
128. See note 67, supra, and accompanying text.
129. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 26.
130. Id. 
pose of Sec. 248(10). As the federal government’s ini-
tial announcement that it intended to enact a GAAR
stated that this rule would introduce a “step-transac-
tions” doctrine,131 it seems reasonable to infer that the
ordinary meaning of “series of transactions” in Sec.
245(3) should correspond to the preordination concept
that the UK House of Lords had developed in this doc-
trine.132 This interpretation is also compatible with the
language and purpose of Sec. 248(10), which adds to
an ordinary series of transactions “related transactions
or events completed in contemplation of the [ordinary]
series”.
With respect to the extended meaning of “series of
transactions”, however, the Court’s interpretation is
less persuasive. Although the conclusion that related
transactions can occur “either before or after” an
avoidance transaction is likely to accord with legisla-
tive intent,133 it is not obvious that this interpretation is
consistent with the text of Sec. 248(10), which might
more reasonably be interpreted to include only related
transactions completed prior to an ordinary series of
transactions but not related transactions completed
after the series.134 Likewise, while the Court was
undoubtedly right to reject an “actual knowledge”
requirement for a related transaction to be completed
“in contemplation of” an ordinary series, the suggested
words “because of” or “in relation to” seem no more
appropriate. Neither phrase corresponds to the diction-
ary definitions of the word “contemplation” and the
latter is redundant since Sec. 248(10) already requires
the additional transaction to be “related” to the ordi-
nary series. Given the Court’s own emphasis on the
ordinary meaning of statutory language,135 it would
have been more appropriate to have interpreted the
words “in contemplation of” to require the series to
have been “intended”, “regarded as possible”, or “con-
sidered” when the related transaction was carried
out.136
(b) Purpose of transaction. With respect to the non-tax
purpose test in ITA, Sec. 245(3), the Court made four
key observations. First, this requirement involves a
“factual inquiry” in which “[t]he Tax Court judge must
weigh the evidence to determine whether it is reason-
able to conclude that the transaction was not under-
taken or arranged primarily for a non-tax purpose”.137
Second, the use of the words “reasonably” and “prima-
rily” in Sec. 245(3) dictates “an objective assessment
of the relative importance of the driving forces of the
transaction”.138 Third, for this purpose, it “will not suf-
fice” that “some alternative transaction that might have
achieved an equivalent result would have resulted in
higher taxes”.139 Finally, the burden of proof and stan-
dard for appellate review are the same for the non-tax
purpose test as they are for characterizing a tax benefit:
“The initial obligation is on the taxpayer to ‘refute’ or
challenge the Minister’s factual assumptions ... by
showing that a bona fide non-tax purpose primarily
drove the transaction”, and “appellate tribunals should
not interfere, absent a palpable and overriding
error.”140
These remarks seem entirely reasonable and consistent
with the structure and aim of the non-tax purpose test
in ITA, Sec. 245(3). Of particular importance, the
Court’s statement that it “will not suffice” for this test
that “some alternative transaction that might have
achieved an equivalent result would have resulted in
higher taxes” suggests that the existence of a higher
taxed alternative transaction might be relevant. Indeed,
where an alternative transaction would have resulted in
higher taxes, the text of Sec. 245(3) states that the
transaction at issue is an avoidance transaction if it or a
series of transactions of which it is a part results in a
tax benefit and if it is carried out primarily to obtain the
tax benefit. This does not mean that the transaction is
“recharacterized” to determine if it is an avoidance
transaction,141 but that it is assessed against an alterna-
tive arrangement that might reasonably have been car-
ried out but for the existence of the tax benefit.142
4.1.3.3. Misuse or abuse
In contrast to its analysis of the concepts of “tax bene-
fit” and “avoidance transaction”, the Supreme Court of
Canada devoted considerable attention in Canada
Trustco to the misuse or abuse requirement in ITA,
Sec. 245(4). Observing that “this requirement ... has
given rise to the most difficulty in the interpretation
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Canadian Oxford Dictionary (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
at 304.
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actual transactions that were executed between them. The facts of the trans-
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invokes reasonableness, suggesting that the possibility of different interpre-
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139. Id., citing Explanatory Notes, supra note 4, at 464.
140. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Paras. 63 and 66(7).
141. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 4. at 464: “Subsection 245(3) does
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mining whether or not it is an avoidance transaction.”
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and application of the GAAR”,143 the Court addressed
three central issues in its analysis: (1) the distinction, if
any, between a misuse of specific provisions and an
abuse of the provisions of the ITA read as a whole; (2)
the process for determining whether a transaction is
abusive; and (3) the burden of proof for this inquiry.144
As an initial matter, the Court also addressed the
retroactive amendment to ITA, Sec. 245(4).145
(a) Amendment to Sec. 245(4). As originally enacted,
Sec. 245(4) stipulated that the GAAR “does not apply
to a transaction where it may reasonably be considered
that the transaction would not result directly or indi-
rectly in a misuse of the provisions of this Act or an
abuse having regard to the provisions of this Act, other
than this section, read as a whole”. In response to two
Tax Court decisions concluding that this language pre-
cluded the rule’s application to the Regulations,146 the
provision was amended in 2005,147 with retroactive
application to the GAAR’s effective date, to stipulate
that the GAAR:
... applies to a transaction only if it may reasonably be
considered that the transaction
(a) would, if this Act were read without reference to
this section, result directly or indirectly in a misuse
of the provisions of any one or more of
(i) this Act,
(ii) the Income Tax Regulations,
(iii) the Income Tax Application Rules,
(iv) a tax treaty, or
(v) any other enactment that is relevant in comput-
ing tax or any other amount payable by or
refundable to a person under this Act or in
determining any amount that is relevant for the
purposes of that computation; or
(b) would result directly or indirectly in an abuse hav-
ing regard to those provisions, other than this sec-
tion, read as a whole.
This change was first announced in the Federal Budget
on 23 March 2004.148 Draft legislation implementing
this amendment was tabled on 8 December 2004,149
and it received Royal Assent on 13 May 2005.
Although originally intended “to clarify that the Act’s
general anti-avoidance rule applies to a misuse or
abuse of the provisions of the Income Tax Regulations,
the Income Tax Application Rules (ITARs), and any
enactments amending the Act, Regulations or ITARs,
as well as to a misuse or abuse of a tax treaty”,150 the
draft legislation also converted the double negative
language of the initial provision to an affirmative test
stipulating that the GAAR “applies to a transaction
only if it may reasonably be considered that the trans-
action ... would ... result ... in a misuse ... or ... an abuse
...”. The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeals in
Canada Trustco and Mathew on 8 March 2005 and
released the decisions on 19 October 2005. As a result,
the appeals were heard after the draft legislation was
released but before it was enacted, and the decisions
were released after the new provision had become law.
Although recognizing that the amendment was enacted
to apply retroactively, the Court nonetheless concluded
that it “has no application to the judgments under
appeal” on the basis that “it cannot apply at this stage
of appellate review, after the parties argued their cases
and the Tax Court judge rendered his decision on the
basis of the GAAR as it read prior to the amend-
ment”.151 The Court added that “even if this amend-
ment were to apply, it would not warrant a different
approach to the issues on appeal” since the amendment
“make[s] it clear that the GAAR applies to tax benefits
conferred by Regulations enacted under the Income
Tax Act” and the Tax Court judge in Canada Trustco
“proceeded on this assumption, which was not chal-
lenged in submissions” to the Court.152
The first conclusion, that a retroactive amendment can-
not apply to pending appeals, appears to be consistent
with established judicial presumptions against retroac-
tive legislation.153 The second conclusion, that the
amendment “would not warrant a different approach to
the issues on appeal”, however, ignored the fact that
new Sec. 245(4) not only extends the application of the
GAAR to the Regulations and other relevant enact-
ments, but also replaces the double negative language
of the former provision with a positive requirement
that the avoidance transaction reasonably be consid-
ered to result in a misuse or abuse. Therefore, to the
extent the Court’s analysis of Sec. 245(4) depends on
the double negative language of the former provision,
it has questionable relevance to future GAAR cases for
which the new language will apply. As explained later
in this article, this may affect the burden of persuasion
that the Minister must satisfy to establish that a trans-
action resulted in a misuse or abuse.154
(b) Misuse and abuse. With respect to the interpreta-
tion of Sec. 245(4), the Court first asked whether the
statutory concepts of “misuse” and “abuse” are differ-
ent or alike. Although the French version of the ITA
uses the same word “abus” to refer to specific provi-
sions and provisions read together, the majority of the
Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC Holdings relied on
the different phrases in the English version of the ITA
to conclude that the misuse analysis looks to specific
provisions in isolation from the broader scheme of the
ITA, while the abuse analysis looks to the purpose,
scheme or policy reflected in the provisions of the ITA
as a whole.155 On this basis, the Federal Court of
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Avoidance Rule”, paper presented at the GAAR Symposium, supra 
note 125.
154. See the discussion in notes 178-179, infra, and accompanying text.
The expression “burden of persuasion” was used by Chief Justice Donald
Bowman of the Tax Court of Canada, speaking at the GAAR Symposium,
supra note 125.
155. OSFC Holdings, supra note 27, Paras. 59-66.
Appeal concluded that the taxpayer had not misused
ITA, Sec. 18(13), but had abused a more general policy
against transferring losses between corporate tax-
payers.156
In Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court of Canada
rejected the bifurcated approach adopted by the major-
ity in OSFC Holdings and instead affirmed Miller
TCJ’s statement in the trial decision that “the analysis
of the misuse of the provisions and the analysis of the
abuse having regard to the provisions of the Act read as
a whole are inseparable”.157 With respect to specific
provisions, the Court suggested that interpretation
“cannot be separated from contextual considerations
arising from other provisions”.158 At the same time, it
emphasized that courts should not “search for an over-
riding policy of the Act that is not based on a unified,
textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the
specific provisions in issue”.159 As a result, the Court
concluded that Sec. 245(4) “requires a single, unified
approach to the textual, contextual and purposive inter-
pretation of the specific provisions of the Income Tax
Act that are relied upon by the taxpayer in order to
determine whether there was abusive tax avoid-
ance”.160
That a misuse of specific ITA provisions “cannot be
separated from contextual considerations arising from
other provisions” is undoubtedly correct as a matter of
statutory interpretation. The Court also rightly con-
cluded that the concept of “abuse” having regard to the
provisions of the ITA read as a whole should be rooted
in these provisions rather than “an overriding pol-
icy”.161 To combine the analysis of a misuse and abuse
into a “single, unified approach”, however, ignores the
statutory language of Sec. 245(4), which refers to a
misuse of the “provisions” of the ITA and other rele-
vant enactments and an abuse “having regard to those
provisions” other than the GAAR “read as a whole”.
More seriously, to limit the “single, unified approach”
to the interpretation of “the specific provisions” of the
ITA that “are relied upon by the taxpayer” to obtain a
tax benefit seems to impede the more wide-ranging
inquiry that is suggested by the concept of “abuse”
having regard to the provisions of the ITA and other
relevant enactments read as a whole. As the Court’s
ultimate decision in Canada Trustco suggests (see
4.2.1.), the absence of this more wide-ranging inquiry
may impede the effective operation of the GAAR.
(c) Abusive transactions. With respect to the process
for determining whether a transaction is abusive under
ITA, Sec. 245(4), the Supreme Court adopted the “two-
stage” approach affirmed by the majority of the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal in OSFC Holdings.162 Thus, the
Supreme Court stated: “The first task is to interpret the
provisions giving rise to the tax benefit to determine
their object, spirit and purpose. The next task is to
determine whether the transaction falls within or frus-
trates that purpose.”163 In addition, it explained that,
although the “overall inquiry” involves “a mixed ques-
tion of fact and law”, the interpretation of specific pro-
visions of the ITA is “essentially a question of law”
while the assessment of specific transactions in refer-
ence to this interpretation is “necessarily fact-inten-
sive”.164
In order to determine the object, spirit and purpose of
the provisions giving rise to the tax benefit, the Court
stated that the first part of the inquiry under Sec.
245(4) “requires the court to look beyond the mere text
of the provisions and undertake a contextual and pur-
posive approach to interpretation”.165 For this purpose,
courts should not search for “an overriding policy” that
is not based on the specific provisions in issue, but
should interpret these provisions “in their legislative
context, together with other related and relevant provi-
sions, in light of the purposes that are promoted by
those provisions and their statutory schemes”.166 In this
respect, the Court emphasized that “it should not be
forgotten that the GAAR is part of the Act”.167
Once the object, spirit and purpose of the provisions
giving rise to the tax benefit are properly interpreted,
the second task under Sec. 245(4) is to determine
“whether the transaction frustrates or defeats the
object, spirit or purpose of those provisions”.168
According to the Court, this determination is “a ques-
tion of fact for the Tax Court judge” with which
“appellate tribunals should not interfere, absent palpa-
ble error”.169 In general, however, the Court suggested
that abusive tax avoidance will occur when taxpayers
rely on specific ITA provisions to achieve results that
the provisions seek to prevent, when transactions frus-
trate or defeat “the underlying rationale of the provi-
sions that are relied upon” to obtain tax benefits, and
when arrangements “circumvent ... the application of
certain provisions, such as specific anti-avoidance
rules, in a manner that frustrates or defeats the object,
spirit or purpose of those provisions”.170 Conversely,
abusive tax avoidance does not exist where an avoid-
ance transaction is determined to be within the object,
spirit or purpose of the provisions that confer the tax
benefit.171 Nor did the Court consider it appropriate to
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characterize an avoidance transaction as abusive solely
because it lacks real economic substance,172 emphasiz-
ing that this consideration is relevant only where the
object, spirit and purpose of the statutory provisions at
issue limit tax benefits to transactions with economic
substance.173
Finally, the Court concluded that “the GAAR can only
be applied to deny a tax benefit when the abusive
nature of the transaction is clear”, so that “[i]f the
existence of abusive tax avoidance is unclear, the ben-
efit of the doubt goes to the taxpayer”.174 Specifically,
the Court explained:
The GAAR may be applied to deny a tax benefit only
after it is determined that it was not reasonable to con-
sider the tax benefit to be within the object, spirit or pur-
pose of the provisions relied upon by the taxpayer. The
negative language in which s. 245(4) is cast indicates
that the starting point for the analysis is the assumption
that a tax benefit that would be conferred by the plain
words of the Act is not abusive. This means that a find-
ing of abuse is only warranted where the opposite con-
clusion – that the avoidance transaction was consistent
with the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions of the
Act that are relied on by the taxpayer – cannot be rea-
sonably entertained. In other words, the abusive nature
of the transaction must be clear. The GAAR will not
apply to deny a tax benefit where it may reasonably be
considered that the transactions were carried out in a
manner consistent with the object, spirit or purpose of
the provisions of the Act, as interpreted textually, con-
textually and purposively.175
In this respect, therefore, the Court appeared to agree
with the conclusion reached by the majority of the
Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC Holdings that the
relevant policy against which an abusive transaction is
assessed must be “clear and unambiguous”.176
The Court’s statement that Sec. 245(4) demands a
“two-step inquiry” involving the initial interpretation
of the ITA and the subsequent assessment of specific
transactions in light of this interpretation seems work-
able and reasonable, as does its conclusion that the first
of these inquiries is a question of law while the second
is a factual determination. The Court is also right to
emphasize that the first inquiry “requires the court to
look beyond the mere text” of the ITA “and undertake
a contextual and purposive approach to interpretation”.
As explained earlier, however, while an analysis
directed at the specific provisions on which a taxpayer
relied to obtain a tax benefit is consistent with the con-
cept of “misuse” of specific provisions, this seems
inappropriate for the more wide-ranging inquiry sug-
gested by the concept of “abuse” having regard to the
ITA provisions and other relevant enactments read as a
whole. To the extent that this language suggests a more
general inquiry into the purposes of the statutory
scheme, therefore, the Court’s approach is unduly
restrictive. For this reason, moreover, the Court’s con-
clusion in Canada Trustco that an avoidance transac-
tion is not abusive solely because it lacks economic
substance may also be questioned. As the Explanatory
Notes accompanying the draft legislation explained:
“Subsection 245(4) recognizes that the provisions of
the Act are intended to apply to transactions with real
economic substance, not to transactions intended to
exploit, misuse or frustrate the Act to avoid tax.”177 As
a result, transactions lacking economic substance
might reasonably be considered to result in an abuse
having regard to the provisions of the ITA read as a
whole.
Finally, it is important to comment on the Court’s con-
clusion in Canada Trustco that the GAAR should
apply only where the abusive nature of an avoidance
transaction is clear, with any doubts resolved in the
taxpayer’s favour. As the Court rightly noted, and this
author has argued elsewhere,178 this conclusion flows
logically from the double negative language of Sec.
245(4) as it formerly read, which stipulated that the
GAAR did not apply to transactions that could reason-
ably be considered not to result in a misuse or abuse.179
As the amended version of Sec. 245(4) has replaced
the double negative language with a positive require-
ment that the GAAR “applies to a transaction only if it
may reasonably be considered that the transaction ...
would ... result ... in a misuse ... or ... an abuse”, it fol-
lows that the burden of persuasion to establish that a
transaction results in a misuse or abuse has been
reversed. Under the retroactively amended provision,
therefore, it is only necessary that the abusive nature of
the transaction be reasonably established; doubts are
resolved in favour of the Crown.
(d) Burden of proof. With respect to the burden of
proof under ITA, Sec. 245(4),180 the majority of the
Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC Holdings held that
neither party has a formal onus to establish the relevant
policy of the provisions, but that the Minister has a
“practical” burden to explain the policy, while the tax-
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payer has “the onus ... to prove the necessary facts to
refute the Minister’s assumptions of fact that the
avoidance transaction in question results in a misuse or
abuse”.181 In Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court of
Canada rejected the distinction between a formal and a
practical burden of proof, insisting that “[t[he taxpayer,
once he or she has shown compliance with the wording
of a provision, should not be required to disprove that
he or she has thereby violated the object, spirit or pur-
pose of the provision”.182 According to the Court:
It is for the Minister who seeks to rely on the GAAR to
identify the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions
that are claimed to have been frustrated or defeated,
when the provisions of the Act are interpreted in a tex-
tual, contextual and purposive manner.183
As a result, it seems that the Court placed the burden
on the Minister to establish not only the object, spirit
and purpose of the relevant provisions, but also the
abusive nature of the avoidance transaction at issue.
Under the former version of Sec. 245(4), which
excluded transactions that could reasonably be consid-
ered not to result in a misuse or abuse, one might rea-
sonably have thought that the taxpayer might bear an
initial burden to advance a reasonable argument that
the avoidance transaction was not abusive, whereupon
the burden would shift to the Minister to establish that
the argument was unreasonable. Under the amended
version, however, which stipulates that the GAAR
applies to transactions that may reasonably be consid-
ered to result in a misuse or abuse, it seems that the
Minister has an explicit burden to advance a reason-
able argument that the transaction is abusive, while the
taxpayer must establish that the argument is unreason-
able.184 As a result, although it is unclear whether the
Court’s interpretation of the burden under Sec. 245(4)
is compatible with the language of the former provi-
sion, it is entirely consistent with the amended version.
4.2. Application to the facts
Based on its general approach to tax law and the
GAAR, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the
Crown’s appeal in Canada Trustco and the taxpayer’s
appeal in Mathew. In each case, the key issue on appeal
was whether the transaction resulted in a misuse or
abuse under ITA, Sec. 245(4).
4.2.1. Canada Trustco
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the
Crown’s main argument in Canada Trustco was that
“the manner in which the respondent structured and
financed the purchase, lease and sublease of the trailers
contravened the object, spirit or purpose of the CCA
regime and resulted in abusive tax avoidance under s.
245(4) of the Income Tax Act”.185 More specifically, the
Crown argued that, because the transactions allowed
the taxpayer to acquire the trailers without incurring
any economic risk, their “real economic cost” was nil,
contradicting the object and spirit of the CCA provi-
sions “to provide for the recognition of money spent to
acquire qualifying assets to the extent that they are
consumed in the income-earning process”.186 In
response, the taxpayer argued that the CCA deductions
were consistent with the text and scheme of the leasing
property and specified leasing property rules and with
the general policy of the ITA that cost means “the price
that the taxpayer gave up in order to get the asset,
except in specific and precisely prescribed circum-
stances” that did not apply.187
Rejecting the Crown’s arguments, the Court relied on
textual, contextual, purposive and consequential con-
siderations to favour the taxpayer’s interpretation of
the relevant statutory provisions.188 Textually, the CCA
provisions refer only to the cost of depreciable prop-
erty “in the well-established legal sense of the amount
paid to acquire the assets”, not amounts at “economic
risk”.189 Contextually, the conclusion that “cost of
depreciable property” generally means the amount
paid for the property is supported by other ITA provi-
sions that make adjustments to the cost of this property
in specific circumstances.190 Furthermore, the Court
stated that the Tax Court judge held that the purpose of
the CCA provisions “as applied to sale-leaseback
transactions” is “to permit deduction of CCA based on
the cost of the assets acquired”.191 Finally, to “rewrite”
the CCA provisions to interpret cost to mean amounts
economically at risk “would be to invite inconsistent
results” which would “vary with the degree of risk in
each case” and “offend the goal of the Act to provide
sufficient certainty and predictability to permit tax-
payers to intelligently order their affairs”.192
More generally, the Court continued, the Crown’s
argument that the meaning of cost for the purpose of
the CCA provisions should be understood as economic
cost or amounts economically at risk reflects an
improper interpretation of the GAAR by reading into
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181. OSFC Holdings, supra note 27, Para. 68. See notes 40-43, supra, and
accompanying text.
182. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 65.
183. Id., suggesting that “[t]he Minister is in a better position than the tax-
payer to make submissions on legislative intent with a view to interpreting
the provisions harmoniously within the broader statutory scheme that is rel-
evant to the transaction at issue”. Whether the Minister is always in a better
position than the taxpayer to make submissions on legislative intent may be
doubted where the taxpayer is well advised and well represented, as was
undoubtedly the case in Canada Trustco and Mathew. For a similar point,
see Sandler, supra note 125.
184. In this respect, see Duff, supra note 27, at 288, arguing that the burden
under Sec. 245(4) as it then read should be “explicitly shifted to the revenue
authorities and relaxed by amending the provision to state that the GAAR
does not apply unless it may reasonably be considered that the transaction
results in a misuse or abuse”. In effect, this is what was accomplished by the
amendments to Sec. 245(4).
185. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 68.
186. Id., Para. 70, citing Water’s Edge, supra note 27, Para. 44.
187. Canada Trustco, supra note 10, Para. 71. See also Para. 72: “The
respondent argues that the transaction was consistent with the object and
spirit of the legislation. The Act’s inclusion of specific provisions that take
‘cost’ to mean the amount ‘at risk’ in limited circumstances illustrates the
general policy of the Act that the term ‘cost’ outside of those specific pro-
visions means cost as understood at law, namely the amount paid. A cost is
not reduced to reflect a mitigation of economic risk.”
188. Id., Para. 73. Although the Court did not explicitly identify conse-
quential considerations as a factor, its decision relied upon them. See text
accompanying note 192, infra. 
189. Id., Paras. 74 and 75.
190. Id., referring specifically to ITA, Secs. 13(7.1) and (7.2), which adjust
the cost of depreciable property in respect of which a taxpayer received
government assistance.
191. Id., Para. 74. See also Para. 78: “The Tax Court judge, after consider-
ing all the circumstances, found that the transaction was not so dissimilar
from an ordinary sale-leaseback to take it outside the object, spirit or pur-
pose of the relevant CCA provisions of the Act and Regulations.”
192. Id., Para. 75.
the ITA an “external” concept of “economic sub-
stance” without regard to “the specific provisions that
are relied upon for the tax benefit”.193 On the contrary,
the Court emphasized that, although consideration of
the economic substance of transactions may be rele-
vant to the application of the GAAR, this is so only
where the object, spirit and purpose of the relevant
statutory provisions limit tax benefits to transactions
with real economic substance.194
Finally, the Court declared that the conclusions of the
Tax Court judge “were based on a correct view of the
law and were grounded on evidence”.195 Specifically,
the Court explained:
The Tax Court judge’s analysis on the issue of abuse
under s. 245(4) is largely consistent with the approach
to the application of the GAAR we have adopted. He
rejected the two-stage overriding-policy approach to
abuse and misuse. He went on to inquire into the policy
or purpose underlying the CCA treatment in sale-lease-
back arrangements. Construing the CCA provisions as a
whole, he rejected the submission that “cost” in the rel-
evant provisions of the Act should be reread as “money
at risk”, and he also rejected the argument that the “eco-
nomic substance” of the transaction determined that
there was abusive tax avoidance. He conducted a
detailed analysis of the transactions to determine
whether they fell within the object, spirit or purpose of
the CCA provisions. In the end, he concluded that a tax
benefit was consistent with the object, spirit and pur-
pose of the CCA provisions and held that the GAAR
could not apply to disallow the tax benefit.196
Consequently, the Court concluded that the trial judge-
ment should be affirmed and the appeal dismissed.
Given the Court’s general approach to the application
of the GAAR and the main argument advanced by the
Crown on appeal, the conclusion in Canada Trustco
seems inescapable. If the GAAR does not generally
prohibit transactions that lack real economic sub-
stance, the Crown’s argument that cost means amounts
economically at risk could not succeed unless the
Crown could point to a general statutory scheme to this
effect. While the Crown might have made more of the
tax shelter rules in ITA, Sec. 143.2 and the partnership
at-risk rules in Secs. 96(2.1) to (2.7) to suggest the
development of a general policy to this effect in
response to judicial decisions defining cost for tax pur-
poses as the amount paid for property,197 the Crown
appears to have eschewed this litigation strategy in
favour of a more general emphasis on economic sub-
stance. The Court dismissed this argument on the
grounds that the Crown misconstrued the GAAR by
importing an “external” concept without regard to “the
specific provisions that are relied upon for the tax ben-
efit”, but this conclusion depends on the Court’s own
narrow interpretation of the abuse analysis in Sec.
245(4). On the contrary, as this author argued earlier, to
the extent that transactions lacking real economic sub-
stance constitute an abuse having regard to the provi-
sions of the ITA read as a whole, the transactions in
Canada Trustco might reasonably have been subject to
the GAAR notwithstanding the absence of a clear
statutory scheme suggesting that cost generally means
real economic cost. More specifically, the production
of CCA deductions through a circular flow of funds
which left the taxpayer at little or no economic risk
with respect to the trailers in respect of which it
claimed the CCA could legitimately be regarded as an
abuse having regard to the provisions of the ITA read
as a whole.
4.2.2. Mathew
As in Canada Trustco, the key point at issue in the
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Mathew was
whether the transactions resulted in a misuse or abuse
under ITA, Sec. 245(4).198 More specifically, the Court
asked whether permitting the taxpayers to deduct the
partnership losses would “frustrate the object, spirit or
purpose” of the specific ITA provisions that give rise to
the tax benefit, namely, the stop-loss rule in Sec.
18(13) and the flow-through rule for partnership
income and losses in Sec. 96(1).199 Consistent with the
“two-part inquiry” that it affirmed in Canada
Trustco,200 the Court first interpreted these provisions
to determine their object, spirit and purpose and then
considered the transactions themselves to determine
whether they defeat or frustrate these purposes.201
With respect to the interpretation of Secs. 18(13) and
96(1), the Court employed the “unified approach to the
textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the
specific provisions of the Income Tax Act that are
relied upon by the taxpayer” that it affirmed in Canada
Trustco.202 Textually, “[i]t is clear that the preservation
of the loss under s. 18(13) is for the benefit of a person
or partnership who does not deal at arm’s length with
the transferor”.203 On the other hand, the text of the
partnership provisions in ITA, Sec. 96 contain “no
restrictions on loss sharing between partners, except
for foreign partnerships under s. 96(8)”.204 Nonethe-
less, the Court continued, a broader contextual analysis
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195. Id., Para. 80.
196. Id.
197. Where a taxpayer acquires a “tax shelter investment” within the mean-
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202. Id., Para. 42, explaining in this context that it rejects the “narrow tex-
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Appeal adopted in its misuse analysis in OSFC Holdings. For the reference
to this “unified approach” in Canada Trustco, see note 160, supra, and
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203. Mathew, supra note 11, Para. 44.
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year”. Where a partnership has no partners who are resident in Canada and
a person resident in Canada becomes a member of the partnership or a per-
son who is a member of the partnership becomes resident in Canada, 
Sec. 96(8) deems property to be acquired at the lesser of its cost or fair mar-
ket value at that time and deems losses to be nil, making it impossible to
transfer accrued losses.
of other ITA provisions supports the opinion of the
Federal Court of Appeal in Canada Trustco that “the
general policy of the Income Tax Act is to prohibit the
transfer of losses between taxpayers, subject to spe-
cific exceptions”.205 At the same time, “it cannot be
automatically inferred from the general policy against
the transfer of losses between taxpayers” that the tax-
payers cannot deduct the losses that they obtained
through the combined operation of ITA, Secs. 18(13)
and 96(1).206 Finally, however, the Court resolved the
issue through a purposive analysis of these provisions,
explaining that the purpose of the stop-loss rule in Sec.
18(13) is to deny the loss to the transferor “because it
originated and remains in the transferor’s control
before and after the transfer”,207 while the purpose of
the loss-sharing rule in Sec. 96(1) is “to promote an
organizational structure that allows partners to carry on
a business in common, in a non-arm’s length relation-
ship”.208 As a result, the Court concluded that “the
combined effect of s. 18(13) and the partnership provi-
sions do [sic] not allow taxpayers to preserve and
transfer unrealized losses to arm’s length parties”.209
Having determined the object, spirit and purpose of the
provisions on which the taxpayers relied in order to
obtain the tax benefit, the Court had no difficulty con-
cluding that the series of transactions resulted in abu-
sive tax avoidance under ITA, Sec. 245(4). According
to the Court:
We are of the view that to allow the appellants to claim
the losses in the present appeal would defeat the pur-
poses of s. 18(13) and the partnership provisions, and
that the Minister properly denied the appellants the
losses under the GAAR.210
Furthermore, the Court added:
The abusive nature of the transactions is confirmed by
the vacuity and artificiality of the non-arm’s length
aspect of the initial relationship between [STIL II] and
[Standard]. A purposive interpretation of the interplay
between s. 18(13) and s. 96(1) indicates that they allow
the preservation and sharing of losses on the basis of
shared control of the assets in a common business activ-
ity. In this case, the absence of such a basis leads to an
inference of abuse. Neither [STIL II] nor [SRMP] ever
dealt with real property, apart from [Standard]’s original
mortgage portfolio. Nor was [Standard] ever in a part-
nership relation with either OSFC or any of the appel-
lants, having sold its entire interest to OSFC. The only
reasonable conclusion is that the series of transactions
frustrated Parliament’s purpose of confining the transfer
of losses such as these to a non-arm’s length partner-
ship.211
As a result, the Court concluded that the taxpayers’
appeal should be dismissed.
It is difficult to disagree with the Court’s conclusion in
Mathew that the transactions at issue were properly
subject to the GAAR. To the extent that the general
policy of the ITA is to disallow the transfer of losses
between taxpayers, the use of a stop-loss rule designed
to prevent superficial losses on non-arm’s length trans-
fers in order to preserve accrued losses to be trans-
ferred to arm’s length investors surely constitutes a
misuse or abuse. What is less clear, however, is why
the Court considered it necessary to speculate on the
purpose of the partnership rules as part of its analysis
under ITA, Sec. 245(4). Having rejected the idea of
separate misuse and abuse analyses, it seems that the
Court considered it insufficient to conclude that the
transaction resulted in a misuse of Sec. 18(13) alone.
As a result, unfortunately, it adopted a questionable
interpretation of Sec. 96(1) that could have significant
and unexpected implications for the allocation of part-
nership losses in subsequent cases. Although partners
have various mutual obligations by virtue of this legal
relationship, it does not follow that they do not deal
with each other at arm’s length. As a result, to limit the
sharing of partnership losses to partners who are not at
arm’s length is contrary to ordinary business practice
and to the general operation of ITA, Sec. 96(1).
5. CONCLUSION
In evaluating the decisions in Canada Trustco and
Mathew, it is important to remember that the Supreme
Court of Canada is a court of general jurisdiction with
a heavy workload. As a result, one should not have
unrealistic expectations about how well it is able to
address complex tax avoidance transactions like those
in these appeals. Indeed, the Court seems acutely
aware of its own limitations in the deference it accords
to the trial decisions in each case and in its repeated
emphasis on the factual nature of most GAAR
inquiries and on the limited role of appellate tribunals.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the Court has per-
formed a generally reasonable job interpreting the
GAAR and setting out a coherent structure to govern
the rule’s application.
Affirming a “textual, contextual and purposive”
approach to the interpretation of the GAAR and the
ITA more generally, the Court’s general conclusion
that the GAAR draws “a line between legitimate tax
minimization and abusive tax avoidance” is sensible
and in keeping with legislative intentions and the struc-
ture of this statutory provision.212 One should also
endorse its general approach to the application of the
GAAR, involving the “three steps” of a tax benefit, an
avoidance transaction, and an abuse under ITA, Sec.
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211. Id., Para. 62.
212. See text accompanying notes 107-110, supra.
245(4),213 its emphasis on the factual nature of the first
two requirements,214 and the two-step approach it
adopted to determine the abusive nature of a transac-
tion according to which courts should first interpret the
object, spirit and purpose of the ITA and then assess
specific transactions in light of this interpretation.215
On the other hand, as this article has demonstrated, the
decisions also reach several conclusions that are diffi-
cult to reconcile with the text and purpose of the
GAAR and with the extended definition of “series of
transactions” in ITA, Sec. 248(10). With respect to the
concept of “tax benefit”, for example, the Court’s
statement that a deduction is always a tax benefit is
incompatible with the GAAR’s structure and its pur-
pose to prevent abusive tax avoidance.216 Although the
Court’s understanding of an ordinary series of transac-
tions is consistent with legislative intent and the text of
Sec. 248(10),217 its interpretation of the extended def-
inition of “series of transactions” bears little relation-
ship to the text of Sec. 248(10).218 More seriously, the
Court’s “single, unified approach” to the concepts of
“misuse” and “abuse” ignores the text of ITA, Sec.
245(4),219 limiting the analysis to an inquiry into the
object, spirit and purpose of the specific provisions
relied upon by the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit and
precluding a more wide-ranging inquiry into an abuse
having regard to the ITA provisions and other relevant
enactments read as a whole.220 Since transactions lack-
ing economic substance might reasonably be regarded
as an abuse having regard to these provisions read as a
whole,221 one might also question the Court’s conclu-
sion that economic substance is only relevant where
the object, spirit and purpose of the specific provisions
at issue limit tax benefits to transactions with eco-
nomic substance.222 On this basis, moreover, one might
challenge the specific outcome in Canada Trustco.
As a final matter, it is important to qualify the Court’s
statement that the GAAR should apply only where the
abusive nature of an avoidance transaction is clear,
with doubts resolved in favour of the taxpayer.223 Since
this conclusion depends on the double negative lan-
guage of Sec. 245(4) as it formerly read,224 it has little
relevance for future GAAR decisions that will be
decided under the amended language. Indeed, although
the amended language confirms the Court’s view that
the burden of establishing a misuse or abuse rests with
the revenue authorities,225 the elimination of the double
negative language suggests that it is sufficient for the
Minister to establish a reasonable case that the transac-
tion results in a misuse or abuse, with any doubt
resolved in favour of the Crown. Given the Court’s
apparent reluctance to hear future GAAR appeals, its
failure to address this issue more clearly is particularly
unfortunate.
© 2006 IBFD
FEBRUARY 2006 BULLETIN 71
213. See text accompanying notes 113-114, supra. 
214. See text accompanying notes 118 and 137, supra.
215. See text accompanying notes 162-164, supra.
216. See text accompanying notes 121-125, supra. 
217. See text accompanying notes 131-132, supra. 
218. See text accompanying notes 133-134, supra. 
219. See 4.1.3.3. under (b).
220. See 4.1.3.3. under (b) and (c).
221. See text accompanying note 177, supra.
222. See text accompanying note 173, supra. 
223. See text accompanying notes 174-176, supra.
224. See notes 175 and 178-179, supra, and accompanying text. 
225. See notes 182-184, supra, and accompanying text.
